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ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL
CONTRACTS IN WASHINGTON
INTRODUCTION: VALIDITY OF ANTENUPTIAL AND
POSTNUPTIAL CONTRACTS IN THE UNITED STATES

I.

Marriage profoundly affects the individual property rights of a man
and a woman. This is true in both community property and common
law property states.' When a prospective husband or wife has been
previously widowed or divorced, it is especially likely that he or she
2
will be aware of the impact of state marital laws on property rights.
This experience may engender a desire to avoid or control the law's
operation. 3 Prior to marriage, the couple may enter into an antenuptial contract delineating each party's property rights. A postnuptial
agreement, 4 executed after marriage, serves the same purpose. Both
types of contract are generally considered valid if fairly made. 5
Each state has developed its own standards for deciding when an
antenuptial or postnuptial contract is "fairly" made. This comment
analyzes the current requirements for validity imposed by the deci6
sional and statutory law of the State of Washington.

I.

In common law property states, common law or statutory rights of dower and

curtesy will limit the spouses' right of testamentary disposition. T. ATKINSON, WILLS §§

29, 30 (2d ed. 1953). In community property states, property acquired by either spouse
during marriage will usually be community property in which each spouse has an undivided one-half interest. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROP-

ERTY § 60 (2d ed. 1971).
2. The increasing number of persons within this class, and therefore potentially interested in such agreements, is indicated by Washington divorce statistics. In the decade
from 1965 to 1975 the number of divorces and annulments granted in Washington rose
from 10,651 to 25,783. BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS, WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF SOCIAL AND HEALTH SERVICES, VITAL STATISTICS SUMMARY 73 (1975), PUBLIC HEALTH
STATISTICS SECTION, WASHINGTON STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, WASHINGTON VITAL STATISTICS SUMMARY 85 (1965).

3.

One recent publication advising lay persons regarding the use of antenuptial and

postnuptial agreements indicates the growing popular interest in this subject. P. ASHLEY, OH PROMISE ME BUT PUT IT IN WRITING (1977).
4. The term "postnuptial agreement" includes "(a) Separation agreements and
property settlement agreements entered into upon or in contemplation of divorce, and
(b) property settlements made where there is no intention to separate." 2 A. LINDEY,
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS AND ANTENUPTIAL CONTRACTS § 90, at 146 (Supp. 1978).

5.

Id.

6.

The taxation of validly executed antenuptial agreements is discussed in Com-

ment, Federal Tax Consequences of Antenuptial Contracts, 53 WASH. L. REV. 105
(1977). The tax problems relating to community property settlement agreements exe-
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Most states, including Washington, analyze the validity of these
contracts in terms of a two-step test: (1) Is the contract "fair" to the
wife? (2) If not, has the husband 7 fully disclosed to his wife the property and legal rights affected by the contract so that his wife's agree8
ment is knowledgeable and voluntary?
The rigor with which the contract's fairness and the husband's disclosure will be assessed appears to depend upon the court's perception
of the actual relationship between the husband and wife. The
relationship is generally presumed to be 6onfidential,9 requiring a
higher standard of disclosure by the husband than would be required
cuted in connection with a divorce or a separation are analyzed in Hjorth, Community
Property Marital Settlements: The Problem and a Proposal, 50 WASH. L. REV. 231
(1974).
7. In most antenuptial or postnuptial contract cases, the wife is the party challenging the contract's validity. Generalized discussions in this comment will assume that situation. Such challenges, however, are not now the exclusive right of wives and the references to the wife as the challenger are only for editorial convenience. See note 9 infra.
8. The test applied to antenuptial agreements is more elaborately stated as follows:
If the provision made for the wife is disproportionate to the husband's means, or
apparently inequitable, unjust and unreasonable, a presumption arises that the husband failed to make a full disclosure. The presumption may be rebutted by proving
full knowledge on the wife's part, at the time she signed the agreement, of all facts
materially affecting her rights.
2 A. LINDEY, supra note 4, § 90, at 159.
9. Factors indirectly related to the confidentiality of the relationship may reduce
the standard of disclosure. An antenuptial contract preceding a second marriage, and
intended to preserve the parties' property for devise to children of a prior marriage, invokes more lenient requirements for validity. See, e.g., In re Estate of Jeurissen, 281
Minn. 240, 161 N.W.2d 324 (1968). Even when a contract does not emphasize estate
conservation, in second marriage situations a trial court's finding that the intended wife
was "mature," "experienced," or a "business woman" may support a minimal duty of
disclosure by the husband. See, e.g., In re West's Estate, 194 Kan. 736, 402 P.2d 117
(1965). In some cases, such a finding nullifies the husband's duty and shifts the responsibility of acquiring any needed information to the intended wife. See, e.g., In re Moore's
Will, 53 Misc. 2d 786, 41 N.Y.S.2d 697 (1943).
On the other hand, courts have held antenuptial agreements executed prior to a marriage which produces children (especially a first marriage) valid only if the husband can
demonstrate his adherence to a high standard of good faith disclosure. See, e.g., Posner
v. Posner, 257 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1972). A few courts have ruled that the duty of disclosure
applies only to husbands. See, e.g., Pniewski v. Przybysz, 183 N.E.2d 437 (Ohio App.
1962). There is a definite trend, however, away from absolute enforcement of the "archaic presumption of the husband's dominance." Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So.
2d 17 (Fla. 1962). A challenging husband is still frequently required to show all the elements necessary to prove fraud, a burden seldom imposed on wives. See, e.g., Stein-Sapir v. Stein-Sapir, 52 App. Div. 2d 115, 382 N.Y.S.2d 799 (1976).
A carefully drawn antenuptial or postnuptial contract can help the husband meet his
burden of showing good faith dealing with his wife. A recital of full disclosure, contained in the contract, is usually persuasive evidence that disclosure was actually made.
See, e.g., Estate of Youngblood v. Youngblood, 457 S.W.2d 750 (Mo. 1970). Contra, In
re Estate of Grassman, 183 Neb. 147, 158 N.W.2d 673 (1968). In some jurisdictions the
recital shifts the burden of proof to the wife, requiring her to show that disclosure was
not made. See, e.g., In re Estate of Stever, 155 Colo. 1, 392 P.2d 286 (1964).
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of a party to an ordinary contract. 10 Courts have declined, however,
to presume a confidential relationship (or have lowered the standard
of candor and good faith required of the husband) in cases in which
the parties were not yet married," the marriage was one of convenience,. or there was a pending divorce.' 3
The standards for evaluating the validity of antenuptial and postnuptial agreements have been developed, for the most part, in common law property states. While following the general contours of the
common law analysis, Washington has developed its own distinctive
rules. This is at least partly explained by the fact that in a community
property state, like Washington, these contracts often have an immediate impact on property rights, and challenges to their validity frequently occur in dissolution proceedings.' 4 In common law jurisdictions, contract challenges arise more often after the death of the first
spouse. Further, as will be discussed, the community property system
itself affects Washington courts' view of rights to marital property.' 5
II.

WASHINGTON ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL
CONTRACTS: THE RIGHT OF SPOUSES
TO CONTRACT BETWEEN THEMSELVES

Washington statutes and decisional law authorize postnuptial contracts. 16 While antenuptial contracts are not directly authorized by

10. See Juhasz v. Juhasz, 134 Ohio St. 257, 16 N.E.2d 328 (1938); 2 A. LINDEY,
supra note 4, at 90-3 8 (rev. ed. 1977); Annot. 117 A.L.R. 993 (1938).
11. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal.

Rptr. 3 (1976).
12.

13.
14.

See, e.g., Rocker v. Rocker, 13 Ohio Misc. 199, 232 N.E.2d 445 (1967).

See, e.g., Thompson v. Brozo, 92 Wash. 79, 159 P. 105 (1916).
In common law jurisdictions contract challenges arise more often after the

death of the first spouse. See cases cited in note 9 supra. During the past 70 years, of 31
challenges to the validity of a husband-wife contract considered by a Washington appellate court, 21 of these challenges were raised in a dissolution context. See note 27 infra.

15. See note 61 infra.
16. Several statutes evidence Washington's recognition of the right of a husband and
wife to contract regarding the status, and thus the ownership, of their property. One statute provides statutory authorization for agreements which convert into community
property any property then held or thereafter acquired, by either the husband or wife,
with right of survivorship. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.120 (1976). The traditional form of
this contract is a "three pronged" community property agreement. See Cross, The Community Property Law in Washington, 49 WASH. L. REV. 729, 805 (1974).
Spouses are also free to effect a change in the opposite direction. They may "provide
by 'separate property agreement' that their existing property and the future acquisitions

of each which otherwise would be community property shall be the separate property of
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statute, 17 Washington case law has long recognized the right of a
prospective husband and wife to contract between themselves regarding their property. 18
Washington spouses' freedom to contract with each other is based
upon the ideal that two mature individuals should be free to bargain
regarding their property. This ideal must be tempered by the fact that
the unique relationship of these parties may make independent bargaining difficult. When an antenuptial or postnuptial contract is challenged, the confidential relationship 19 of the parties may affect the
the acquiring spouse." Id. This possibility is generally recognized by Washington decisional law, and is specifically authorized by statute with respect to deeds of a spouse's
community interest in real property. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.050 (1976). A recent addition to Washington dissolution law, R.C.W. § 26.09.070, recognizes a couple's right to
execute a "separation contract" which is binding on the divorce court unless found to be
unfair at its execution. Id. § 26.09.070.
17. An oblique statutory reference to antenuptial contracts is contained in Washington's Statute of Frauds, R.C.W. § 19.36.010, which requires that "[e]very agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual
promises to marry" must be in writing and signed by the party charged with the promise. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.36.010(3) (1976).
18. Clark v. Baker, 76 Wash. 110, 135 P. 1025 (1913) (antenuptial agreement valid
so long as it met the usual contract requirements of form and lack of ambiguity).
19. Washington courts generally recognize the mitigating effect of a confidential relationship on the strictly enforced nine requirements for establishing fraud as a basis for
setting aside a contract. The nine factors necessary to establish fraud are summarized in
Turner v. Enders, 15 Wn. App. 875, 552 P.2d 694 (1976):
The question to be decided is whether the nine elements of fraud were proven by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. These nine elements are as follows:
(I) A representation of an existing fact; (2) its materiality; (3) its falsity; (4)
the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its truth; (5) his intent
that it should be acted upon by the person to whom made; (6) ignorance of its
falsity on the part of the person to whom it is made; (7) the latter's reliance on
the truth of the representation; (8) his right to rely upon it; (9) his consequent
damage.
Id. at 878, 552 P.2d at 696.
A confidential relationship may modify these requirements in several ways. While
proof that there has been no misrepresentation is enough to avoid a charge of fraud, the
presence of a nonfamilial confidential relationship raises an affirmative duty to show
adequate disclosure. See Pike v. Parallel Film Distributors, 74 Wn. 2d 218, 443 P.2d
804 (1968). The nonfamilial confidential relationship also justifies an otherwise unreasonable reliance on any representations. See Salter v. Heiser, 36 Wn. 2d 536, 219 P.2d
574 (1950). In a familial relationship, other than marriage, the court considers the possibility of undue influence. See McCutcheon v. Brownfield, 2 Wn. App. 348, 467 P.2d
868 (1970). If insufficient consideration is alleged, undue influence must be extreme to
overcome the presumption of a gift and the rule that love and affection are sufficient
consideration for intrafamily transfers. See Binder v. Binder, 50 Wn. 2d 142, 309 P.2d
1050 (1957).
In determining whether antenuptial and postnuptial agreements are valid, courts do
not rely on either the familial or nonfamilial confidential relationship precedents, an
omission which emphasizes the unique character of these agreements. The courts' oftenexpressed concern that an intrafamily transfer is only a gift is not a relevant consideration in this context. Washington decisions interpret antenuptial and postnuptial contracts as creating bargains, not gifts. The two step test, see note 8 and accompanying
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analysis of its validity. The court's use of legal formulas will be affected by its generalizations regarding marriages about to be dissolved

as opposed to ongoing marital relationships, as well as by its assessment of the individuals in the particular case. The spectrum ranges
from a strict contractual analysis (wherein fraud is the only defense),
employed because the parties appear to have bargained at arm's
length, 20 to apparent adherence to an unstated rule that wives always

win.

21

The decisions regarding the validity of Washington antenuptial or
postnuptial contracts generally recognize the existence of a confidential relationship between a husband and wife (or prospective husband
and wife), 2 2 no matter how independent the spouse may be or how
imminent the dissolution. The effect of the confidential relationship is
expressly considered in some cases. 23 In others, the duties of parties in

such a relationship are analyzed as part of the burden of showing
good faith imposed on the party asserting good faith by R.C.W. § 26.-

16.210.24 Under either a confidential relationship or a good faith
text supra, is employed to decide, initially, if the contract is fair. If it is not fair (i.e., a
bad bargain), the court tries to determine whether execution by the challenging spouse
was voluntary. In making this determination the court considers disparities in bargaining position. The analysis is parallel to that used in nonfamilial confidential relationships where the actual situation of the parties, not their legal status, is determinative.
20. Malan v. Malan, 148 Wash. 537, 269 P.,836 (1928) (contract analysis used to
uphold a separation agreement, with emphasis on the fact that the marriage was the second for both parties, entered into late in life for companionship, not love). Tausick v.
Tausick, 52 Wash. 301, 100 P. 757 (1909) (strict fraud analysis used to uphold the validity of a pre-divorce property settlement agreement).
21. This rule is usually applied in cases where there is a clear disparity in bargaining power. See Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564, 48 P.2d 941 (1935) (court invalidated a
will contract signed by the wife when her opinionated and overbearing husband was ill
and she feared her refusal would make him so angry he would die). See also text accompaying footnotes 61 & 62 infra.
22. Friedlander v. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972). The court
stated the Washington rule: "It is well recognized that even an engagement to marry
creates a confidential relationship." Id. at 301, 494 P.2d at 213. Contra, In re Marriage
of Dawley, 17 Cal. 3d 342, 551 P.2d 323, 131 Cal. Rptr. 3 (1976) (court said it would
not presume a confidential relationship between a man and woman not yet married).
See also notes 9-13 and accompanying text supra.
23. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977).
24.

WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.210 (1976). The statute provides, "In every case,

where any question arises as to the good faith of any transaction between husband and
wife, whether a transaction between them directly or by intervention of third person or
persons, the burden of proof shall be upon the party asserting the good faith." Id. See,
e.g., Jones v. Jones, 56 Wn. 2d 328, 353 P.2d 441 (1960); In re Marriage of Cohn, 18
Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977) (analysis of good faith based on the requirements of
R.C.W. § 26.16.2 10). See also In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790
(1977) (analysis of the requirements of good faith without reference to R.C.W. § 26.16.210).
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analysis, the results of Washington cases indicate that the nature of
the relationship at the time the contract was made will affect the standards of fair dealing required for validity. Less confidentiality is presumed, probably justifiably, when an agreement is executed in contemplation of dissolution. Recent nondissolution cases show a
tendency to minimize the presumed effects of a confidential relationship in all marital situations. 2 5 These results appear to evidence a general judicial opinion that modern marriages involve less dependence
between spouses and, perhaps, less long-range commitment.
III.

OVERVIEW OF WASHINGTON DECISIONS: THE
DISTINCTION BETWEEN "SEPARATION
CONTRACTS" AND "MARITAL CONTRACTS"

Traditional analysis has treated antenuptial contracts separately
from agreements created during marriage. The latter category includes agreements executed in preparation for dissolution and agreements within an ongoing marriage, both analyzed together as postnuptial contracts. Since the analysis used by Washington courts
appears to vary depending on the degree of confidentiality of the parties' relationship at the time the contract is made, a division different
from the usual antenuptial/postnuptial one would be more profitable
for the study and prediction of Washington results.
This comment will first consider husband-wife contracts created in
contemplation of dissolution. The term "separation contract" will be
used to refer to this particular kind of postnuptial contract. The analysis will then turn to those contracts executed when an ongoing marriage is contemplated. Such contracts may be executed before
marriage (antenuptial agreement) or during marriage when dissolution is not a consideration (postnuptial agreement). The term adopted
for these two kinds of contracts is "marital contract," an indication of
the parties' objective, rather than their status, at the time of execution.
Since 1900 the Washington appellate courts have considered the
validity of properly executed husband-wife contracts in thirty-one
cases involving thirty-two contracts. 26 Nineteen contracts were held
25. Whitney v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 90 Wn. 2d 105, 579 P.2d 937 (1978); In re
Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977); In re Marriage of Cohn, 18
Wn. App. 508, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
26. The following chart provides a numerical breakdown of all the Washington decisions since 1900 concerning the validity of properly executed antenuptial and post-
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valid and thirteen contracts were ruled invalid (i.e., not binding). This
apparent tilt in favor of validity is attributable solely to separation
contracts. Of those agreements-a total of nineteen-thirteen were
held valid, six invalid. The other category, marital contracts, presents
an almost even split. Of a total of thirteen contracts, six were held
valid, seven invalid. Nevertheless, the distinction between the analysis
of separation contracts and marital contracts, apparent from these
numbers, is seldom explicitly mentioned in the cases.2 7
nuptial contracts. The case results are indicated for each of the proposed analytic
categories, separation contracts and marital contracts.
Marital Contracts
13*

Valid
6

Invalid
7

Separation Contracts
19*

13

6

Total
(Marital and
Separation Contracts
32*

19

13

A list of the cases represented by this chart appears in N. Phelps, Judicial Gallantry
Makes Way for Contractual Freedom: Washington Law Regarding Antenuptial and
Postnuptial Contracts, 33-34 (Feb. 1978) (unpublished monograph in Condon Hall Library, University of Washington School of Law).
*These figures, drawn from 31 cases, reflect decisions on the validity of 32 contracts.
The court upheld the validity of an antenuptial contract and of a separation contract in
In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
27. Reference to the differing standards of analysis for the two types of contracts is
made in Thompson v. Brozo, 92 Wash. 79, 159 P. 105 (1916). The court distinguished a
prior case, Yeager v. Yeager, 82 Wash. 271, 144 P. 22 (1914), by discussing the differing
objectives of the contracts in the two cases. Yeager concerned a marital contract executed as part of a reconciliation. It was distinguished in Thompson as the "antithesis" of
that case's separation contract made in contemplation of divorce: "The deed was there
procured [in Yeager], not in contemplation of a divorce desired by both parties, but for
the professed purpose of preventing a divorce and bringing about a reconciliation. The
distinction is too plain to require amplification." 92 Wash. at 82, 159 P. at 196.
An indirect indication of the differing analyses applied by Washington courts to marital and separation contracts can be seen in the courts' refusal to be bound by the
parties' own denomination of their agreement as a separation contract. A reconciliation
plus a lengthy period of resumed marital relationship following execution of a "separation contract" may lead a court to use tests for validity usually applied to marital contracts.
The effect of a reconciliation was considered in Logan v. Logan, 141 Wash. 62, 250
P. 641 (1926). Refusing to enforce a separation agreement followed by nine years of
continuing marriage, the court said, '[I] n so far as that contract contained an agreement with reference to any prospective divorce action, it had reference only to such a divorce action as was then within the contemplation of the parties." Id. at 69, 250 P. at
644. See also In re Marriage of Alexander, 14 Wn. App. 222, 540 P.2d 457 (1975). In
Alexander the couple executed a separation contract, separated, then were reconciled.
In a dissolution action, filed two years after the contract was made, the Washington
Court of Appeals held that the property settlement contained in the contract was not
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VALIDITY OF WASHINGTON SEPARATION
CONTRACTS

The relatively clear rules the Washington courts have developed for
separation contracts will be considered before turning to the more
confused state of the law regarding marital contracts. The nineteen
separation agreement decisions since 190028 reflect, with almost
unbroken consistency, a traditional contractual analysis.2 9 In the majority of these cases, the only defenses that concern the court have
been those available to invalidate any contract: fraud, coercion, and
duress. Although the confidential relationship requirements of disclosure, good faith, or both are sometimes mentioned, they are generally
dealt with summarily.
A.

Predominant Use of TraditionalContractAnalysis

Tausick v. Tausick30 was an early case illustrating the courts' reluctance to set aside a separation contract merely because one of the
parties had made a bad bargain. The court upheld the validity of a
real property deed from the wife to her husband, executed by her in
connection with a pending divorce. While conceding that the settlement represented by the transfer was "improvident," the court said:
Mere inadequacy of consideration is not enough to avoid a contract
entered into between parties of mature judgment, nor can one who
claims to have been overreached invite the review of a court of equity
unless the inadequacy of consideration is so great that a presumption
31
of fraud follows the recital of the transaction.
binding. Id. at 224, 540 P.2d at 459. For further discussion of this case, see note 55 infra.

By contrast, courts have declined to use the Logan analysis when the execution of the
separation contract was followed by a short period of reconciliation, or even a brief remarriage. Jones v. Jones, 56 Wn. 2d 328, 353 P.2d 441 (1960) (separation contract retained its contemplation-of-divorce character, despite the couple's brief remarriage);
Burch v. Rice, 37 Wn. 2d 185, 222 P.2d 847 (1950) (the court, distinguishing Logan,
upheld a separation contract followed by a six-month reconciliation).
28. See note 26 supra (table).
29. This emphasis on traditional contractual analysis is especially clear in Short v.
Short, 54 Wn. 2d 284, 340 P.2d 168 (1959). In Short the Washington Supreme Court
agreed with the lower court that there would have to be some compelling reason (and
none was shown) to disregard the parties' clearly expressed and fully executed agreement. "The intention of the parties determines whether a property settlement agreement
is to be considered as a final adjudication of their rights and property." id. at 288, 340
P.2d at 170.
30. 52 Wash. 301, 100 P. 757 (1909).
31. ld. at311-12, 100P. at761.
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The presumption in Tausick that dissolution settlements are binding
of the sepcontracts made by independent parties is apparent in most
32
aration contract cases decided in the last seventy years.
The challenger's failure to show fraud, duress, or coercion in the
execution of the separation contract is the basis of most decisions upholding such contracts. A finding that execution of the contract was
voluntary (and therefore lacked coercion or duress), that no fraud was
involved, or that both conditions existed underlies nine of the thirteen
cases in which the separation agreement was enforced.3 3 Washington
courts are not easily convinced that these traditional contract defenses
34
have been established.
B.

Limited Considerationof the Marital Confidential
Relationship and of Disclosure

Although separation agreement analysis emphasizes, and usually
turns upon, the existence of traditional contract defenses, some decisions do discuss confidential relationship considerations.3 5 In these
discussions, the courts appear to recognize the possibility that agreements between a husband and wife about to separate may hot have
been negotiated at arm's length.
A requirement that the party defending the agreement show his or
her good faith in the contract's execution is one means of compensating for the possible effect of a confidential relationship. R.C.W. §
26.16.210 appears to require this analysis; 36 nevertheless, the statute
32. See, e.g., Parsons v. Tracy, 127 Wash. 218, 220 P. 813 (1923); In re Marriage of
Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
33. See, e.g., In re Bubb's Estate, 53 Wn. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 859 (1958). The cases are
listed in N. Phelps, supranote 26, at 36.
34. For example, the fact that a separation agreement settlement is disproportionate does not necessarily make the contract fraudulent. See Thompson v. Brozo, 92
Wash. 79, 159 P. 105 (1916).
The one case in which a Washington court invalidated a separation contract because
of fraud indicates the extreme circumstances needed to justify this result. In Richardson
v. Richardson, 36 Wash. 272, 78 P. 920 (1904), the wife received a divorce settlement of
$2,500 out of the couple's $23,000 in community property. The court was persuaded to
invalidate the contract by the wife's evidence that she signed the contract because of her
husband's threats and intimidation.
35. See, e.g., In re Bubb's Estate, 53 Wn. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 859 (1950); In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934).
36. The statute is quoted in note 24 supra. In Erfurth v. Erfurth, 90 Wash. 521, 156
P. 523 (1916), the court held that the statute was applied only to attacks by third parties.
That decision was overruled in In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280
(1934). Madden established the rule that the good faith statute is applicable to challenges
by a spouse, as well as to challenges by a third party. Cf.Jones v. Jones, 56 Wn. 2d 328,
353 P.2d 441 (1960) (challenge by a third party).
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is seldom mentioned in separation contract cases. When it is discussed, the analysis of its requirements is usually cursory,3 7 and does
not lead to invalidation of the contract. 38
In re Madden's Estate39 is the only separation contract case in
which the statutory good faith requirement was applied with any rigor. The evidence showed that during a violent quarrel the husband
wrote and the wife signed an agreement to convey to him by deed all
her community property rights in exchange for $1,000, an amount
the court later described as grossly inadequate. The court then used
the statutory good faith requirement to invalidate the contract as
40
clearly not the product of arm's length negotiations.
Analysis of the nonchallenger's disclosures and the actual knowledge of the challenger is a second means by which a court may recognize the impact of a confidential relationship and implement a test
less strict than the usual fraud requirements. Nevertheless, as with the
good faith test, consideration by the courts of disclosure and actual
knowledge in separation contract cases is generally quite limited 4'
and the test for validity is easily met. The cases indicate that adequate
disclosure is shown by evidence that the wife had time to consider the
contract's effect, 4 2 or that the wife understood the terms offered by
the husband (even though he expressly refused to reveal the value of
the property affected by the contract). 43 The contract also has been
37. See In re Bubb's Estate, 53 Wn. 2d 131, 331 P.2d 859 (1958). In that separation
contract case, the court merely used R.C.W. § 26.16.210 as a starting point for the application of a strict fraud test:
From this statute [R.C.W. § 26.16.2 10], petitioner argues that the property settlement agreement is presumptively fraudulent. We do not agree. Although, on numerous occasions, this court has scrutinized, with particular care, transactions
between husbands and wives and agreements affecting their property rights.... it
has never held that such agreements or transactions are presumptively fraudulent.
Id. at 134, 331 P.2d at 861.
38. The good faith required by R.C.W. § 26.16.210 is mentioned in only five Washington separation contract cases. Analysis of the statute led to invalidation of the contract in only one of the cases. In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934).
39. 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934).
40. After the usual declaration that husband-wife contracts are not presumptively
fraudulent, the Madden court said, "The statute, however (Rem. Rev. Stat., § 5828 [precursor to R.C.W. § 26.16.210]), does impose upon the executor here [the husband] the
burden of establishing the fairness and good faith of the agreement." Id. at 54, 28 P.2d at
282.
41. Only one case, In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977),
includes an extended analysis of the duty of disclosure and requirement of actual
knowledge. This may be explained by the fact that the case also concerned the validity of
an antenuptial contract.
42. Tausick v. Tausick, 52 Wash. 301, 100 P. 757 (1909).
43. Lee v. Lee, 27 Wn. 2d 389, 178 P.2d 296 (1947).

144

Antenuptial and Postnuptial Contracts
sustained when the wife was told she could get separate counsel (but
did not do so), 4 4 and when the wife could have requested more information (but failed to do so). 45 Courts analyzing disclosure and actual
knowledge have invalidated only one of the ten separation contract
46
cases in which those factors are mentioned.
Washington courts' reluctance to apply the confidential relationship requirements of good faith or disclosure with any intensity ap-

pears to signal an unspoken judicial presumption that an imminent
dissolution sharpens the parties' self-interest so that inequality of bar-

gaining positions is unlikely. The relatively few separation contract
cases in which courts have held contracts invalid under either a strict

contractual or a confidential relationship analysis support this hypothesis. These contracts presented situations, recognized by the
court, which did not merit an assumption of arm's length negotia47
tion.
C.

Effect of the 1973 DissolutionAct Presumptionof Validity
on the Application of the Good FaithStatute

The one analytic problem relating to separation contracts with
which the courts have not yet dealt is the effect of the 1973 Washing-

ton Dissolution Act 4s on the analysis which has traditionally been applied to these cases. Specifically, R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3), 49 which
44. Halvorsen v. Halvorsen, 3 Wn. App. 827, 479 P.2d 161 (1970); Peste v. Peste, 1
Wn. App. 19, 459 P.2d 70 (1969).
45. In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
46. In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934). See generally N.
Phelps, supra note 26, at 37.
47. In both In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash. 51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934), and Richardson v. Richardson, 36 Wash. 272, 78 P. 920 (1904), the respective courts found that gross
inequity of the contract, coupled with duress, indicated inequality of bargaining position. A strict fraud test was applied in Richardsonand probably could have been used in
Madden.
In Logan v. Logan, 141 Wash. 62, 250 P. 641 (1926), and In re Marriage of Alexander, 14 Wn. App. 222, 540 P.2d 457 (1975), the contracts were invalidated because a
lengthy period of reconciliation followed execution of the separation contract. See note
27 supra and note 55 infra. While neither case clearly enunciates the analytic basis of
the decision, strict contractual analysis would invalidate use of the contract for a later
dissolution, not contemplated at the time of execution, as being an application not
within the parties' intent. Another explanation of the results in these cases may be that
courts presume that parties who discuss dissolution and then are reconciled are not so
completely estranged that a presumption of arm's length negotiation would be justified.
48. WASH. REV. CODE ch. 26.09 (1976).
49. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1976). The statute provides in part:
If either or both of the parties to a separation contract shall at the time of the exe-
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gives separation contracts presumed validity, appears to conflict with
the burden of proof requirement of the good faith statute, R.C.W. §
26.16.210.50
When a Washington court analyzes the effect of a marital contract
on a dissolution property distribution, it has great discretion to invalidate the contract if it was not "just and equitable." 5 ' Such discretion
was authorized by R.C.W. § 26.08.110, now repealed by the 1973
Dissolution Act and replaced by R.C.W. § 26.09.080.52 Trial court
discretion under R.C.W. § 26.08.110 to invalidate husband-wife contracts found to be unjust or unfair also applied to separation contracts, but it was seldom mentioned in that context. 53 Nevertheless, in
the few separation contract cases where the trial court did exercise its
discretion to invalidate the contract, it appears that the buiden of
showing the contract's fairness was placed on the party asserting its
binding effect: "In an action for divorce, a property settlement or
cution thereof, or at a subsequent time, petition the court for dissolution of their
marriage, for a decree of legal separation, or for a declaration of invalidity of their
marriage, the contract, except for those terms providing for the custody, support.
and visitation of children, shall be binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the economic circumstances of the parties ... that the separation contract
was unfair at the time of its execution.
Id.
50. See note 24 supra.
51. Erickson v. Erickson, 53 Wn. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 297 (1959).
52. R.C.W. § 26.08.110 gave the divorce court power to make "such disposition of
the property of the parties, either community or separate, as shall appear just and equitable, having regard to the respective merits of the parties, to the condition in which they
will be left by such divorce . . . , and to the party through whom the property was acquired." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.08.110 (West 1961) (repealed 1973).
R.C.W. § 26.09.080 provides that in a dissolution proceeding:
[T] he court shall, without regard to marital misconduct, make such disposition of
the property and the liabilities of the parties, either community or separate, as shall
appear just and equitable after considering all relevant factors including, but not
limited to:
(1) The nature and extent of the community property;
(2) The nature and extent of the separate property;
(3) The duration of the marriage; and
(4) The econorhic circumstances of each spouse at the time the division of
property is to become effective ....
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.080 (1976).
53. The theoretical power of the divorce court, prior to passage of the Washington
Dissolution Act of 1973, to use its discretion to invalidate a separation contract is most
clearly stated in Richardson v. Richardson, 69 Wn. 2d 59, 417 P.2d 157 (1966). That
case, which upholds the use of divorce court discretion to invalidate a separation contract which was at least arguably "fair," represents the apogee of that analysis. Since it
was the last appellate decision to hold a separation contract invalid prior to passage of
R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3), which limits trial court review of separation contracts, Richardson is presumably now of only historical interest. Rieke, The Dissolution Act of 1973:
From Status to Contract? 49 WASH. L. REV. 375, 394-98 (1974), contains further analysis of the effect of R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3).
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agreement between the parties may be entirely disregarded by the
court, and should be followed in dividing the property between the
parties. . . only when the court is satisfied that the agreement is fair
and just . . . 54
This burden of proof placed on the one asserting the contract's validity is analogous to the burden of showing good faith imposed by
R.C.W. § 26.16.210 in that the same party would assert both fairness
and good faith. Thus, prior to the enactment of the 1973 Dissolution
Act, the requirements of R.C.W. § 26.16.210, although seldom used
in analyzing separation contracts, could have been used without any
statutory conflict. The revised dissolution law appears to have
changed this situation.
The new separation contract statute, R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3), creates a presumption of validity by switching the burden of showing a
contract is unfair to the one challenging its binding effect; the agreement is binding unless shown to be unfair. 5 5 With the statutory burden of proof now placed on the challenger, it would be inconsistent
also to invoke the good faith statute which places the burden of proving essentially the same thing (that the contract is fair) on the nonchallenger.
In enacting the presumption of validity statute, R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3), the legislature appears to have excepted separation contracts
from those husband-wife contracts to which the good faith statute
previously applied. Both statutory interpretation and case analysis,
however, lead to the conclusion that this exception should be strictly
limited to contracts executed in contemplation of dissolution. The
presumption of validity statute expressly applies only to "separation
contract [s]- .56 Although that term is not specifically defined, the legislature authorized "separation contracts" to promote the settlement
54. Atkins v. Superior Court, I Wn. 2d 677, 685, 97 P.2d 139, 142 (1939).
55. Unfortunately, the only application of this new rule has muddied what appears
to be a clear statutory pronouncement. In In re Marriage of Alexander, 14 Wn. App.
222, 540 P.2d 457 (1975), the appellate court upheld the trial court's disregard of a

property settlement agreement, which was executed prior to a two year period of reconciliation before a dissolution action was finally commenced. The court could have based
a finding of invalidity on the rationale in Logan v. Logan, 141 Wash. 62, 250 P. 641
(1926). See note 27 supra. Instead, the court considered the parties' changed circumstances after two years and then, unaccountably, indicated that their contract was not
enforceable under R.C.W. § 26.09.070(3), because it was 'unfair at the time of its execution."' In re Marriage of Alexander, 14 Wn. App. 222, 224 n.2, 540 P.2d 457, 459

n.2 (1975).
56. WASH. REV.CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1976).
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of disputes attendant upon separation or the filing of petition for dissolution. 57 Therefore, a contract negotiated at the end of a marital relationship is clearly contemplated. Further, the statute appears to codify separation contract case analysis in which courts have seldom
dealt with the question of who has the burden of proof, notwithstanding the good faith statute. 58 If the presumption of validity statute is
applied only to predissolution agreements, as this comment argues it
should be, the statutory good faith protection will have been eliminated only for those husband-wife contracts, the negotiation of which
is least likely to be affected by a confidential relationship.
V.

VALIDITY OF WASHINGTON MARITAL CONTRACTS

Contracts between husband and wife, executed before or during an
ongoing marriage, elicit a critical review from Washington courts.
Until recently, the analysis of marital contract cases has borne only a
superficial resemblance to that used in separation contract cases.
Three recent cases,5 9 however, cast doubt on the continued vitality of
some previously applied marital contract rules. These three cases suggest at least partial acceptance of the traditional contractual standards
for validity used in separation contract cases. This change may be explained by a general perception that women, as they become more independent, need less protection. Concurrently, paternalistic court
decisions, compensating for the influence of overbearing husbands,
have become less justifiable in light of recent Washington statutory
changes .6 o
57. R.C.W. § 26.09.070(1) provides:
The parties to a marriage, in order to promote the amicable settlement of disputes
attendant upon their separation or upon the filing of a petition for dissolution of
their marriage, a decree of legal separation, or declaration of invalidity of their
marriage, may enter into a written separation contract providing for the maintenance of either of them, the disposition of any property owned by both or either of
them, the custody, support, and visitation of their children and for the release of
each other from all obligation except that expressed in the contract.
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.070(1) (1976).

58. See text accompanying footnotes 36-38 supra.
59. Whitney v. Seattle-First Nat'l Bank, 90 Wn. 2d 105, 579 P.2d 937 (1978); In re
Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977); In re Marriage of Cohn, 18
Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
60. Three pieces of legislation, passed within the past decade, are especially relevant to marital contract analysis:
(1) Washington community property law was changed so that husbands are no longer
the sole managers of the marital community's personal property. Prior to its amendment in 1972, R.C.W. § 26.16.030 provided that" [t]
he husband shall have the management and control of community personal property, with a like power of disposition as
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A.

The TraditionalApproach

Early Washington marital contract decisions appear to have turned
on the courts' unexplained "rule" that wives (and only wives) should
be protected from the untoward effects of marital contracts. This double standard is best seen by comparing the emphasis placed on the
adequacy of the consideration involved. In two early cases the contracts were upheld when challenged by the husband, despite the clear
inadequacy of consideration given by the wives.6 1 In each case involving a wife's challenge to the contract, however, the court held the contract invalid. The courts expressed great concern over the inadequacy
of consideration and found that the burden of showing good faith was
62
jnot sustained by the husband.
The clearest analysis of the traditional approach to review of
63
marital contracts was presented in 1954, in Hamlin v. Merlino.
he has of his separate personal property, except he shall not devise by will more than
one-half thereof." WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1961) (current version at
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976)). The amended version of § 26.16.030 provides
that property "acquired after marriage by either husband or wife or both, is community
property. Either spouse, acting alone, may manage and control community property,
with a like power of disposition as the acting spouse has over his or her separate property . . . ." WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976).

(2) An Equal Rights Amendment has been added to the Washington State Constitution. The sixty-first amendment provides that "[e]quality of rights and responsibility
under the law shall not be denied or abridged on account of sex." WASH. CONST. art.
XXXI § 1.
(3) Washington dissolution law now specifically recognizes the right of a husband and
wife, about to separate, to contract regarding the distribution of their property. WASH.
REV. CODE § 26.09.070(3) (1976), quoted in note 49 supra.
61. In Erfurth v. Erfurth, 90 Wash. 521, 156 P. 523 (1916), the husband quitclaimed
property to his wife for $ 1. Two years later, after the couple separated, he attacked the
deed's validity. Although the consideration was clearly inadequate, the court went out of
its way to uphold the contract by limiting the application of the good faith statute, Rem.
Rev. Stat. § 5828 (now WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.210 (1976), to challenges by third parties. This limitation was overruled a few years later in In re Madden's Estate, 176 Wash.
51, 28 P.2d 280 (1934).
The court, in Miller v. Miller, 32 Wn. 2d 438, 202 P.2d 277 (1949), used the parol evidence rule to protect a woman's interest under an antenuptial deed. Although the marriage never took place and the woman gave no other consideration, the transfer to the
intended bride was upheld.
62. In Yeager v. Yeager, 82 Wash. 271, 144 P. 22 (1914), the court emphasized the
wife's lack of understanding of the contract, prepared by her husband's attorney, which
she signed without benefit of independent counsel. After finding that the husband had
not sustained his burden of showing good faith, the court refused to enforce his wife's
transfer of property to him for inadequate consideration.
The court, in Reagh v. Dickey, 183 Wash. 564,48 P.2d 941 (1935), citing the applicability of Rem. Rev. Stat. § 5828 (now WASH. REV.CODE § 26.16.210 (1976)), refused to
uphold a will contract signed by the wife without independent advice, and under the duress and undue influence of her husband. Again, inadequacy of consideration was an
important factor. 183 Wash. at 569, 48 P.2d at 944.
63. 44 Wn. 2d 851,272 P.2d 125 (1954).
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That decision made explicit the reasoning that underlies the results in
the earlier cases. In response to an attack by the wife's devisees, the
court held invalid an antenuptial agreement executed prior to a marriage which was the second for both husband and wife. The analysis
focused on the combined effect of a confidential relationship and the
parties' unequal power (as prescribed by statute) to manage property
acquired by the marital community. 64 The Hamlin court also considered other factors in determining the contract's validity: Mrs. Merlino
could not read or write and had received no independent counsel regarding the agreement. The court's overriding concern, however, was
the unequal positions of the parties, prescribed by societal norm and
reinforced by community property law. That inequality required strict
65
enforcement of the husband's duties under the good faith statute.
The next major pronouncement 66 on the requirements for a valid
marital contract came almost twenty years later, in Friedlander v.
Friedlander.67 Friedlander represents the apogee of Washington's
strict scrutiny of marital contracts. The court's rules, apparently
enunciated in order to guarantee wives' protection from overreaching
husbands, became anachronisms almost immediately.
The Friedlanders' antenuptial contract was invalidated in a divorce
action. Citing Hamlin v. Merlino, the Friedlandercourt stressed the
64. Under Washington community property law, all the benefits from the parties'
contract went to Mr. Merlino:
The full significance of [the provisions of the parties' agreement] can be seen only
when the relative positions of the parties are considered. Under our basic community property statute, RCW 26.16.030, the husband is made the manager of the
community personal property ...
It is apparent that, under our law, the agreement between Angelo and Lucia
Merlino, in so far as it affected property which otherwise would belong to the community, heavily favored Angelo. It was he who had the management and control of
the community property. He had the opportunity and the power to take or place
community property in his own name and, thus, to change its character to that of
his separate property [by operation of the antenuptial agreement].
Id. at 865-66, 272 P.2d at 132.
65. WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.210 (1976).
66. In Erickson v. Erickson, 53 Wn. 2d 832, 337 P.2d 297 (1959), a per curiam
opinion upheld the trial court's use of discretion in making an unequal divorce property
settlement notwithstanding the provisions of a previously executed community property
agreement.
The court, in In re Napier's Estate, 55 Wn. 2d 194, 347 P.2d 192 (1959), upheld a
widow's transfer of her community property to a testamentary trust set up by her husband. The court appeared to assume that the will contract, which required the transfer,
was not binding but found that the transfer, once completed, was itself valid. Id. at 200,
347 P.2d at 196.
67. 80 Wn. 2d 293, 494 P.2d 208 (1972).
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importance of the couple's confidential relationship. 68 This created
the husband's burden of showing that the contract, in which provision
for the wife was disproportionate to his means, was executed by his
wife voluntarily and with full knowledge. 69 The court found that Mr.
Friedlander had not made the disclosures necessary to his wife's
knowledgeable execution of the contract. 70 Presumably this finding
alone would justify the conclusion that he had not sustained his burden of showing good faith dealing with his wife. The court, however,
citing Hamlin, added a "rule" that the wife must have signed the contract "on independent advice with full knowledge of her rights. '7 1 Finally, and again unnecessarily, the court concluded that this contract
was void at its inception.
B.

Recent Interpretationsof the Independent Advice Requirement

Since Friedlander,Washington courts and attorneys have wrestled
with the apparently absolute requirement of independent counsel and
the corollary, that a contract without it is void, rather than merely
voidable. In 1973 a court of appeals decision appeared to signal the
possibility of some retrenchment. 72 How far that retrenchment has actually gone is the question raised by the Washington Supreme Court's

68.

Id. at 301, 494 P.2d at 213.

69. The court stated the standard for evaluating the husband's good faith disclosure:
[The wife need not] know the exact financial status of his resources. However, she
must at least have a full and fair disclosure of all material facts relating to the
amount, character and value of the property involved so that she will not be prejudiced by the lack of information, but can intelligently determine whether she desires to enter the prenuptial contract.
Id. at 302, 494 P.2d at 214 (emphasis in original).
70.

Id. at 303, 494 P.2d at 214.

71.

Id. (emphasis in original).

It is unlikely that the writers of the Hamlin decision would recognize this as their
"rule." What the Friedlandercourt used is an edited version (without adding ellipses for
the deleted material) of a quote in Hamlin of a long passage from 2 A. LINDEY, supra
note 4. The emphasis on independent advice was supplied by the Friedlandercourt. The
Hamlin opinion only mentioned the lack of independent advice as one of many. factors

that would bear on the fairness of an antenuptial contract. Hamlin v. Merlino, 44 Wn.
2d 851, 864, 272 P.2d 125, 132 (1954).

72. In Moore v. Moore, 9 Wn. App. 951, 515 P.2d 1309 (1973), the appellate court
pointedly noted that the lower court decision invalidating an antenuptial agreement by
applying the Friedlanderrule was not appealed and therefore was not reviewable by the

court. The court then stated, unnecessarily for the decision at hand, that Friedlander
stood for the proposition that, in the absence of a full and fair disclosure of all assets, an
antenuptial agreement is void. Id. at 953, 515 P.2d at 1310. The independent advice re-

quirement is conspicuously missing from this restatement.
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1977 decision, In re Marriage of Hadley,73 and its 1978 decision,
Whitney v. Seattle-First National Bank,74 as well as by a 1977 court
of appeals decision, In re Marriageof Cohn.75
The Hadley court upheld the use of marital contracts, executed as
part of the couple's estate plan, as the basis of a dissolution property
disposition. The court restated the Friedlanderand Hamlin tests7 6 for
marital contract validity and found that they had been met.
Despite some evidence that Mrs. Hadley did not fully understand
the contracts, the court concluded that Mr. Hadley demonstrated
good faith and candor in his dealings with his wife. 77 Hadley further
relaxed the standards for marital contract validity by modifying the
Friedlander independent advice requirement almost beyond recognition. Mrs. Hadley had asked an attorney for advice but failed to bring
him the information he thought necessary, so no advice was ever
given. That was enough: "While this [failure to provide the needed
information] may have been an unfortunate omission on her [Mrs.
'7
Hadley's] part, it is unfair to penalize Mr. Hadley for it." 8
In In re Marriage of Cohn,79 the court upheld the use of an antenuptial contract and a separation contract as the basis for a dissolution property disposition. With the help of the Hadley court's interpretation of the Hamlin-Friedlandertests, the Cohn court held that
there was no absolute requirement of independent counsel. According
to the court, Friedlander and Hamlin only require that "if advice is
given, . . . it be from an independent party." 80 Then, following the im-

plicit ruling in Hadley, the Cohn court put the burden of getting such
advice on the challenging spouse. 81
In Whitney v. Seattle-FirstNational Bank, a widow's challenge to a
73. 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790 (1977). See also 53 WASH. L. REV. 763 (1978).
74. 90 Wn. 2d 105, 579 P.2d 937 (1978).
75. 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79 (1977).
76. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793. According to the Hadley court, the tests from
Ham in and Friedlander are:
(1) whether full disclosure has been made by respondent [Mr. Hadley] of the
amount, character and value of the property involved, and (2) whether the agreement was entered into fully [sic] and voluntarily on independent advice and with
full knowledge by the spouse of her rights.
id.
77. Id. at 655, 565 P.2d at 793.
78. Id.
79. 18 Wn. App. 502, 569 P.2d 79.
80. Id. at 509, 569 P.2d at 83.
81. The court in Cohn said:
If Mrs. Cohn did not understand the provisions of the property settlement agree-
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will contract which she and her husband had signed was rejected. The
supreme court discussed the independent counsel requirements developed in the Hamlin, Friedlander,and Hadley decisions. Nevertheless,
it avoided the difficult problem of applying those requirements in a
manner consistent with both the language and result in Hadley by distinguishing all three cases. The Whitney court found that the agreements involved in Hamlin, Friedlander,and Hadley did not make fair
and reasonable provision for the wife.8 2 By contrast, the Whitneys'
contract was fair. The court then held:
Because the [Whitneys'] agreement was fair and reasonable, and
because [Mrs. Whitney] has not shown fraud or overreaching, there is
no absolute requirement that the wife have acted upon the competent
independent advice of counsel, or that she be specifically informed of
83
her right to seek the same.
Despite the Hadley court's purported adherence to Hamlin and
Friedlander,it is clear that between 1972 and 1977 there was a distinct change in Washington's judicial view of marital contracts. As the
Hadley decision indicates, the distinction is not between antenuptial
and postnuptial contracts. 84 What appears to be missing from recent
cases is the protective attitude toward wives that was so apparent in
Hamlin and Friedlander. The contrast between the treatment given
the relatively self-sufficienct Polly Friedlander, who was protected by
the court, and the apparently dependent Claudette Hadley, who was
not protected, evidences this change but does not explain it.85
The Hadley decision contains very few clues to the rationale underlying this change. One indication of the court's rationale is its emphasis on the contractual nature of the Hadley's agreements, and the possible reliance thereon by third parties, as well as by Mr. and Mrs.
ment or its effect, there is no evidence that she ever let her husband or the attorney
know of her lack of knowledge. As in the case of In re Marriageof Hadley, supra, it
would be unfair to penalize Mr. Cohn for Mrs. Cohn's omission to request further

information.
Id. at 510, 569 P.2d at 84.
82.
83.

90 Wn. 2d at 10-11, 579 P.2d at 939-40.
Id. at 11, 579 P.2d at 940.

84. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793.
85. Polly Friedlander is described in the Friedlanderopinion as 40 years old and in
good health. At the time of the dissolution she was two quarters away from obtaining a
college degree in fine arts and operated her own commercial art gallery. 80 Wn. 2d at
298, 494 P.2d at 211. In contrast, Claudette Hadley was dying of multiple sclerosis,

confined to a wheel chair, and by her testimony, dependent on her husband's business
advice. 88 Wn. 2d at 651, 669, 565 P.2d at 791-92,,801.
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Hadley. 8 6 At one point the court said the agreements were valid
87
merely because there was no fraud or overreaching by the husband.
This contractual analysis was, of course, not used in Hamlin or Friedlander.
C.

Statutory Changes Since Friedlander

The Hamlin court avoided using the traditional fraud standard because the parties' relationship was both confidential and unequal. The
latter was true because R.C.W. § 26.16.03088 authorized Mr. Hamlin, but not Mrs. Hamlin, to manage community property. That same
law prevailed during the Friedlanders' marriage. In 1972, however,
the legislature amended R.C.W. § 26.16.030 so that either the husband or wife could manage the community property.8 9 Legislative
history indicates that the "purpose [of the 1972 Community Property
Amendments was] to establish the equal positions of the two
spouses." 90
The effect of this statutory change on the application of the Hamlin
and Friedlander precedents is not mentioned in the Hadley opinion.
This omission may stem from the fact that neither party's appellate
brief mentions the 1972 amendment of R.C.W. § 26.16.030.91 Also,
a direct application of the changed statute would have been difficult
since not all of the Hadley agreements were executed after 1972. Nevertheless, because of the Hamlin court's reliance on the old form of
86.
87.
88.

88 Wn. 2d at 655. 565 P.2d at 793.
Id.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1961) (amended 1972). See also note

60 supra.

89. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.16.030 (1976).
90. Cross, 1972 Amendments to the Washington Community Property Law, WASH.
S.B. NEWS, April 1972, at 9, 10.
Professor Harry Cross, who was a member of the drafting committee for the 1972
changes, reports that the committee considered the desirability of providing protection
for wives by requiring joint actions by the husband and wife. However, the committee's
final conclusion was that equality was more important than protection, so the final bill
included few joint action requirements. Professor Cross concludes:
The thrust of the legislation is to establish equality for husband and wife as regards their community property so each has a managing and transferring power
with reference to all community property, essentially as extensive as the husband's
managing power has theretofore been.
Id. at 9.
91. See Brief of Appellant, In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790
(1977); Brief of Respondent, In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d 649, 565 P.2d 790
(1977).
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the statute, the amendment of the statute necessarily affects the analysis of Washington marital contracts. The amendment will have to be
dealt with explicitly in a future case, probably one in which the agreement being challenged was executed after 1972.
The effect of the statutory change allowing wives to manage community property will likely be evaluated in connection with the good
faith statute, R.C.W. § 26.16.210. In Hamlin the high standard for
the husband's duties of disclosure was supported by the statutory good
faith requirement and the husband's statutory privilege of managing
community property. 92 The results in Hadley and Cohn demonstrate
that Washington courts are applying a diminished standard for proving good faith disclosure of the value of the property involved and the
effect of the contract. This lessening of the good faith requirement
may be explained by the disappearance of the unequal management
basis for the Hamlin decision. It is probable that eventually, the court
will expressly recognize that removal of wives' statutory disability
supports liberalization of the standard.
Hadley appears to have eroded any possible effect of the good faith
statute on the independent advice requirement. In that case the court
appeared to hold that, once counsel was made available, the burden
was on the challenger to take advantage of that advice. 93 The Cohn
court went further, placing on the challenger the onus of proving that
he or she sought any needed disclosures.9 4 Such a shift in the burden
of proof is understandable in the context of separation contracts when
the presumed validity statute and the good faith statute interact.9 5 A
shift in the burden of proof to avoid the Friedlanderabsolute requirement of independent advice might also be justifiable. 9 6 Nevertheless,
the Cohn court's extension of this shift in the burden of proof, beyond
92.
93.

See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
88 Wn. 2d at 655, 565 P.2d at 795.

94.

18 Wn. App. at 509-10, 569 P.2d at 83-84.

95.
96.

See text following note 55 supra.
Language in the Whitney case makes it probable that relaxation of the Friedlan-

der independent advice "rule" will not be implemented by the drastic shift in the burden
of proof used by the Cohn court. The Whitney court mentions a general rule that "inde-

pendent advice is only one factor to be considered in the analysis of the overall transaction." 90 Wn. 2d at 109, 579 P.2d at 938. This discussion is unnecessary to the final

decision in Whitney, that independent advice prior to execution of a "fair" marital contract is not necessary. It seems likely, however, that in analyzing "unfair" contracts, like
those in Hadley, the Whitney court's factor approach will be adopted. Given the factual

context of Hadley, it appears that availability of counsel, as much as actual counsel, will
be considered a factor in determining overall fairness.
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the independent advice requirement to other elements in marital contract analysis such as disclosure, appears unjustified. The equal management statute, R.C.W. § 26.16.030, by its own terms does not
require such a drastically nullifying effect on the good faith statute as
the presumption of validity statute perhaps does.
Despite the increasing independence and self-sufficiency of wives,
the relationship of a couple within, or prior to, an ongoing marriage
remains "one of mutual confidence and trust which calls for the exercise of good faith, candor and sincerity in all matters bearing upon the
proposed agreement. ' 97 This relationship contrasts with the adversary
position often assumed by parties to a separation contract. The distinction between marital and pre-separation relationships justifies the
continued use of the good faith statute in analyzing marital contracts,
even though it may no longer be applicable to separation contracts.
VI.

CONCLUSION: SUGGESTIONS FOR THE
EXECUTION OF A VALID ANTENUPTIAL OR
POSTNUPTIAL CONTRACT

The Friedlander "rule," that a marital contract is initially invalid
when each spouse does not have independent advice, appears to be
dead. But the Hadley statement of a two-pronged test, requiring full
disclosure and voluntary, knowledgeable execution, certainly remains. The Hadley decision does not clearly specify the circumstances
which trigger the test. The conservative practitioner, however, would
anticipate its use whenever the contract makes a property disposition
to the wife which is disproportionate to the means of the husband.9 8
This is essentially the test used in Friedlander.With the passage of the
Washington equivalent of the Equal Rights Amendment, 99 as well as
R.C.W. §§ 26.09.070(3) and 26.16.030,100 the same tests will likely
be applied to challenges by a husband. Based on current Washington

97. Friedlander, 80 Wn. 2d at 301, 494 P.2d at 213.
98. The interpretation of the Hadley decision made by the Whitney court reinforces
this prediction. In Whitney, the court said that the trial court in Hadley made no finding
that the Hadley agreements "made fair and reasonable provision for the wife. The fact
that the trial court did not so find resulted in the application of the alternative test,
whether the agreements in Hadley were 'voluntarily and knowingly signed.' " 90 Wn. 2d
at 110- 1I1, 579 P.2d at 939 (quoting Hadley, 88 Wn. 2d at 654-55, 565 P.2d at 790).
99. WASH. CONST.art. XXXI, § 1.
100. See text following notes 49 and 88 supra.
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law, the following suggestions for the execution of a valid "disproportionate" marital contract may be helpful:
(1) Disclosure: No Washington decision has considered the effect
of a recital of full disclosure' 0 ' in an antenuptial or postnuptial contract. Decisions in other states indicate that such a recital, especially if
an actual disclosure of the amount and value of the property involved
is also included in the contract, should be persuasive that adequate
02
disclosure has been made.'
(2) Explanation of the contract's effect: The drafting attorney
should provide both parties with a documented explanation of the
contract's effect. Since the status of the independent advice requirement is still not completely clear, this procedure should be followed
even though one spouse has been advised to seek separate counsel.' 03
The Hadley court, in a dissolution proceeding, enforced a contract intended (and apparently explained to the wife) as an estate planning
device. Nevertheless, an explanation of all the contract's possible effects, unintended as well as intended, would be prudent.
(3) Independent counsel: Although the Hadley decision made it
clear that a "disproportionate" marital contract will not be held invalid solely because one spouse did not have independent counsel,
04
lack of counsel is still a factor which a court will consider.'
In Hadley two facts appear to support the court's conclusion that
the independent advice requirement was met: the drafting attorney
was the "family lawyer" and Mrs. Hadley's ineffectual attempt to seek
independent counsel indicated that she was at least aware of the possibility of obtaining counsel. When the drafting attorney has previously
101. A recital of disclosure is a statement in the contract that each party has completely disclosed to the other the value of his or her property and the effect the contract
will have on the other's rights to that property. This is to be distinguished from actual
disclosure, in the contract, of the property involved including a description and accurate
estimate of value. It would be advisable to include both the recital and actual disclosure

in any husband-wife contract.
102. See note 9 supra.
103. The Cohn court held that the independent advice requirement meant only
that any advice given must be independent. 18 Wn. App. at 509, 569 P.2d at 83. That

decision would apparently require an attorney who drafted a marital contract for the
husband to hand it to the wife without comment other than a request for her signature.
It is unlikely, however, that the Washington Supreme Court would approve such a
procedure. Relaxation of the independent advice requirement did not negate the requirement of disclosure in the Hadley case. 88 Wn. 2d at 655, 565 P.2d at 793. This po-

sition is reaffirmed by the discussion of the Hadley decision in Whitney. 90 Wn. 2d at
I10-11, 579 P.2d 939-40.
104. See note 98 supra.
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represented only one of the parties (and therefore is not the "family
lawyer"), the documented suggestion of independent counsel for the
unrepresented spouse is clearly in order. Such a suggestion from the
"family lawyer" may not be necessary, but as the court in Whitney advised, 10 5 it will help to insure the contract's validity in a later challenge.
(4) Good faith: Finally, the Washington statutory requirement of
good faith dealings between husband and wife still applies to marital
agreements. Despite the increasing independence of wives, there may
still be circumstances in which proof of the husband's good faith
would be very difficult. To guarantee the contract's validity, the attorney should consider the relative bargaining positions of the parties at
the time of execution. In extreme situations anything less than independent advice is likely to invite a return to protective precedents.
Strict scrutiny may be predicted when a wife (or intended wife) is
young, unsophisticated, lacks schooling or work experience, is unfamiliar with the English language, or cannot read or write. In such situations only the wife's consultation with an independent attorney is
likely to meet the second Hadley requirement, that the contract be entered into "voluntarily on independent advice and with full knowledge
106
by the spouse of her rights."'
Nancy C. Phelps*

105. After ruling that the lack of independent counsel did not invalidate a "fair"
marital contract, the Whitney court disclaimed any intent to "dissuade counsel from
recommending that independent counsel be consulted in appropriate cases." 90 Wn. 2d
at 111, 579 P.2d at 940. The court then advised: "The presence of advice from independent counsel is a desirable cautionary step, however, where there is a possibility that the
fairness or reasonableness of the agreement will be subject to later attack." Id. at Ill 12, 579 P.2d at 940.
106. 88 Wn. 2d at 654, 565 P.2d at 793.
* Member, Washington State Bar Association; B.A., 1975, J.D., 1978, University
of Washington.
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